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TO LOBBY OR NOT TO LOBBY:
THAT IS AN IMPORTANT QUESTION
Kermit V. Lipez*
As part of the nomination process to be a federal judge, I
went to Washington in 1997 for a so-called White House
interview (which actually takes place in the Eisenhower
Executive Office Building) with lawyers from the President's
Office of Legal Counsel and the Justice Department. I was then
a member of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court.1 Evaluating
how I worked with my colleagues on the court, one of the
lawyers asked if I believed in lobbying them to win support for
my views. Without hesitation I said that I did not. I had never
lobbied my colleagues and they did not lobby each other.
Of course, we were not discussing lobbying that involved
asking for a favor or promising a return favor in a future case.
That kind of lobbying is improper. Rather, the lobbying at issue
would be on the merits-one-on-one conversations, face to face
or by telephone (the court had no email at that time)-with the
objective of persuading a colleague to agree with my view of the
case. I explained that I did not believe in such lobbying because,
inevitably, the effort becomes personal, with an undesirable
pressure on both sides of the exchange. The judge who lobbies
wants to prevail. The judge being lobbied may feel an impulse to
please. Also, I saw lobbying as divisive, creating factions on a
court that valued cohesiveness. And so I told my interviewer
that I had never done it.
My answer about lobbying reflected the culture of the
Maine Supreme Court, where the seven justices dealt with the
cases collectively, without side conversations between justices.
We did not discuss cases before oral argument. Our postSenior Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
1. Formally, this is the proper title for Maine's highest court. For the sake of
simplicity, I refer subsequently to the "Maine Supreme Court."
*
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argument conferences were invariably formal. The pre-assigned

justice2 would speak first, declaring a position that was a
recommendation to the other justices, who then voted in
ascending order of seniority, with the Chief Justice voting last.
The explanations for the votes were brief. We did not challenge
or ask questions of each other, understanding that the decision of
the conference was subject to change during the writing process
and the review of the draft opinion by colleagues.
If we had a split vote during the conference, it was in full
view of the court. If disagreements emerged in response to a
circulated draft opinion, they played out openly through the
circulation of comment memos shared with every member of the
court. Although four of us had chambers in the Cumberland
County Courthouse in Portland, the home of the Maine Supreme
Court, and our other three colleagues were in courthouses in
other parts of the state, the four of us in Portland scrupulously
avoided discussing the cases apart from our colleagues. There
were occasional jokes about the Portland cabal, but we all
valued our sense of shared mission as a court too much to

jeopardize it with side discussions of two or three. Expressing
our disagreements in memos that everyone would see, we relied
on the force of those memos to persuade our colleagues to join
us. If they did not, we would dissent or recede, and move on to
the next case.
I have now had a different experience on the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, where I have served for
over fifteen years. Inescapably, my answer to a question today
about my belief in lobbying would reflect that experience. It is
no longer a simple answer.
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS-THE PANELS
The federal Courts of Appeals do most of their work in
panels of three judges. Only in the exceptional circumstance of
en banc review,3 which involves less than one percent of the
2. Cases were randomly assigned to the seven justices in advance of argument. Law
clerks would prepare bench memos on the pre-assigned cases. Those memos were then
shared with all of the justices.
3. En banc review means, at least in the smaller circuits, that the entire court of
appeals reviews the decision of the trial court or the administrative agency, usually
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cases in any given Court of Appeals,4 do all of the active judges

hear and decide a case. Thus, unlike the Maine Supreme Court,
the Court of Appeals as a whole rarely works together on a
case.5 The action is on the panels, whose membership is always
changing, and the norm there is for the three judges to work
openly together to find common ground. Although dissents on
my court are not rare, they are not done casually. Our initial
effort is to achieve consensus, beginning with the discussions at
the post-argument conference. Unlike the structured format of
the conferences on the Maine Supreme Court, the First Circuit
panel conferences follow no predictable pattern, varying in form
with the judge who happens to be presiding that day.6
Sometimes the presiding judge will speak first, and then invite
comments from colleagues. Other times the presiding judge will
invite colleagues to speak first.7
If differing views emerge during the conference, there is an
opportunity to talk them through, not in great detail, but in
enough detail to allow the writing judge to understand the
concerns that must be addressed if there is any hope of getting a
unanimous decision. Also, the conference reveals degrees of
conviction about a position-firm, leaning, undecided. If one
colleague is already in firm disagreement with the other two,
there is probably little gain in trying to draft an opinion that will
meet those concerns. If the colleague is leaning or undecided,
however, the writing judge will draft with that colleague's
concerns in mind.
For the most part, the comment period that follows the
circulation of an opinion on the Court of Appeals is like the
comment period on the Maine Supreme Court. The non-writing
following a decision by a panel of three judges that first heard the appeal. The vote to hear
a case en banc means that the decision of the panel is withdrawn. It is then up to the en
banc court to resolve the case.
4. Pauline T. Kim, Deliberationand Strategy on the United States Court of Appeals:
An Empirical Exploration of PanelEffects, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1319, 1368-69 (2009).
5. On the First Circuit, the smallest of the circuits, the court as a whole means the six
active judges.
6. The Chief Judge, if a member of the panel, or the most senior active judge on the
panel serves as the presiding judge.
7. There is often a tactical consideration in this choice. Speaking first gives you an
opportunity to establish the terms of the discussion and perhaps persuade an undecided
colleague.
8. The presiding judge makes the writing assignments at the conference.
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judges on the panel state their concerns in memos shared with
the entire panel. The writing judge will redraft with these
concerns in mind and circulate a revised opinion. There will be
another exchange of memos, and this process will continue until,
ideally, the judges agree on a final draft, or, as sometimes
happens, one judge decides to dissent.
There is an exception to this process, however, that signals
a difference in culture between the Maine Supreme Court and
the First Circuit. In response to a draft decision that has just
been circulated, one member of the panel will ask the third
member to defer responding to the draft until the member asking
for time has an opportunity to circulate a response. Such a
request usually reflects major concerns with the circulating
opinion and a desire to shape the law of the case before the third
member of the panel commits to a position. Sometimes this
request is in the form of a memo shared with the writing judge.
Sometimes the request is in the form of a phone call or email
that excludes the writing judge.
This latter circumstance creates awkwardness. It feels rude
to ignore the request of your colleague. It feels deceptive to keep
the writing judge in the dark. Although there is no engagement
yet on the merits of the case, and hence no lobbying in that
sense, this willingness to exclude a colleague from a
conversation about the case during the panel deliberations can
become problematic during the en banc process.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS-EN BANC
The en banc court is an artifact of division. Unlike a state
supreme court, which usually operates as a collective body, the
en banc court ordinarily assembles only when enough of its
members have voted to withdraw a panel opinion and hear the
case anew in front of all of the active judges on the court and
any senior judge who may have been a member of the panel.9
These are not the votes of judges on a higher court undoing the
decision of a lower court. These are your own colleagues

9. On rare occasions, the judges on a court of appeals can agree to hear a case initially
en banc, without the case first being heard by a panel of judges.
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undoing your work.' 0 There is no minimizing the unpleasantness
of this phenomenon, which is why en banc review can be the
most divisive event in the life of a court of appeals. And that is
why the judges on the court should take particular care to
minimize this divisiveness. Lobbying for or against en banc
review can have the opposite effect.
That said, I did such lobbying once. The circumstance was
unusual. I had written an important majority opinion with
substantive and procedural components. There was a strong
dissent. When the inevitable petition for en banc review arrived,
I knew that my dissenting colleague would be lobbying for en
banc review of the entire case. This lobbying would not.take the
form of a memo urging en banc review sent to all of the judges.
It would involve phone calls to particular judges.
Despite my distaste for the practice, I decided to make
phone calls of my own. Believing that what mattered most was
preserving the substantive portion of the decision, I told my
colleagues that, if the vote for en banc review was denied, the
panel majority would be willing to issue a new opinion with
only the substantive portion of the decision retained. Agreeing
that this was a fair compromise, the colleagues whom I called
committed to vote against en banc review. When my dissenting
colleague made calls seeking to undo the entire decision, it was
too late.
Afterward, I was glad that I had preserved the most critical
part of an important decision, even though I had lost my
lobbying purity. I realized that I would probably do it again if
the stakes were high enough. That experience, however, did not
change my view that routine lobbying during the en banc
process, aimed at controlling the law of the court whenever
possible, can impair the collegiality of a court.
III. LOBBYING AND COLLEGIALITY

Any critique of lobbying on an appellate court must
acknowledge its most famous success. In Brown v. Board of
10. On the First Circuit, en banc review will take place if four of the six active judges
vote for it. See Fed. R. App. P. 35(a) (requiring a majority vote); Ist Cir. R. 35(a)(1)
(same).
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Education," Chief Justice Warren lobbied his colleagues one by
one to get a unanimous vote:
In his meetings Warren pressed for two results: a
unanimous decision that would demonstrate that the court
was unshakable; and a ruling unencumbered by concurring
opinions that might dilute the legal authority upon which
they were overturning Plessy.
One by one the associate justices fell in behind the Chief.
They agreed to hand down a decision declaring segregation
unconstitutional, yet avoid immediate imposition of a
simple rule for ending segregation.12
There are other well-documented examples of side
conversations among Supreme Court justices on momentous
cases. In 1992, during the post-argument consideration of
PlannedParenthoodof Southeastern Pennsylvaniav. Casey,' a
case that threatened to overturn Roe v. Wade,14 Justice Kennedy
met privately with Justices O'Connor and Souter to draft an
opinion that would save the essence of Roe.15 Nonetheless,
Justice Kennedy frowns on such lobbying before argument:
Before the case is heard, we have an unwritten rule. We
don't talk about it with each other. [If the rule is violated],
we send a memo to everybody about what we've talked
about, because we don't want little cliques or cabals or
little groups that lobby each other.16
Justice Kennedy's different attitudes toward pre- and postargument lobbying on the Supreme Court suggest the
complexity of the lobbying question. He recognizes that
lobbying has the potential to create cliques and cabals on an
appellate court, thereby threatening the collegiality that is so
important to its effectiveness. But his behavior, and that of Chief
Justice Warren, reflects the reality that the stakes in a case are
sometimes so high that lobbying for an outcome may be
justifiable.

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Ed Cray, ChiefJustice:A Biography ofEarl Warren 283 (Simon & Schuster 1997).
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
See Linda Greenhouse, Becoming Justice Blackmun 204 (Times Books 2005).
Adam Liptak, No Vote-Trading Here, 159 N.Y. Times WK1 (May 16, 2010).
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I accept the wisdom of these Supreme Court examples.
Categorical judgments against lobbying on an appellate court are
unwise. The subject does not lend itself to absolutes. There may
be times when the outcome in a case will be so important that
private conversations between judges about the case, to the
exclusion of their colleagues, may be justifiable. But the force of
these Supreme Court examples for the work of the Courts of
Appeals should not be overstated. We are, after all, an
intermediate court of appeals. In calculating the costs and
benefits of lobbying on our courts, the negative impact of
lobbying on the collegiality of the court will seldom be matched
by the magnitude of the case.
The concept of collegiality is often invoked in the
discussion of appellate courts. As my late colleague Frank
Coffin wrote in one of his fine books, "'collegiality' descends
from the Latin word collegium, meaning a body of colleagues or
co-workers" engaged in a shared enterprise.17 This shared
enterprise, working as it should, affirms the premise of appellate
courts-multiple judges working harmoniously together have a
better chance of getting it right than a single judge working in
isolation. These judges respect each other's positions, recognize
their own fallibility, and are open to persuasion. Judge Harry
Edwards has put it well. On a collegial court,
judges have a common interest, as members of the
judiciary, in getting the law right, and ... as a result . .. are
willing to listen, persuade, and be persuaded, all in an
atmosphere of civility and respect. Collegiality is a process
that helps to create the conditions for principled agreement,
by allowing all points of view to be aired and considered. 8
Lobbying threatens this collegiality in concrete ways. First,
it may breed an us-against-them mentality on the court.
Inescapably, judges form natural alliances over time with certain
colleagues because of similar judicial philosophies and life
experiences. There is nothing harmful to collegiality in this
natural process, even when these alliances form during the en
banc voting process. But lobbying can turn these natural
17. Frank M. Coffin, On Appeal: Courts, Lawyering, and Judging 213 (W.W. Norton
1994) (italics original).
18. Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on JudicialDecision Making, 151 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1639, 1645 (2003) (footnote omitted).
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alliances into hostile camps, with conspiratorial conversations
taking place within sub-groups of the court.
Second, there is the unflattering motive for lobbying-the
belief that participating in an open contest for support of one's
position will not suffice, and that one's colleagues will respond
only to the personal pressure that lobbying always entails. That
pressure breeds resentment over the outcome of the vote for en
banc review. The lobbying process disserves everyone involved.
To be sure, as I have already suggested, en banc
proceedings are inherently divisive. They are always marked by
some tension. The judges from the original panel, or the
majority of that panel, inevitably feel like they have been taken
to the woodshed. There is a harder edge, however, to the en banc
proceedings generated by lobbying. The questions from the
bench during the oral argument, though formally directed at
counsel, are often testy commentaries on the positions of
colleagues on opposing sides of the en banc vote. The en banc
conference following such argument has a particularly sullen
quality. Sometimes the judges raise their voices, requiring the
Chief Judge to restore order. And the original panel majority
almost always ends up in the minority after the en banc vote.
The strong feelings displayed at the en banc conference
persist after the circulation of a majority decision for the en banc
court. The majority in the withdrawn panel opinion composes a
dissent that pushes the limits of civil disagreement on the court.
These sharp exchanges go on through multiple rounds, each side
vying for the last word with increasing impatience. One can
almost hear the annoyed muttering in chambers throughout the
circuit. The process finally ends because it must. But the hard
feelings linger.
IV. CONCLUSION

I have heard of appellate courts that approach dysfunction
because of the clash of personality and ideology. Despite the
divisive en bancs that I have described, my court is not remotely
like that. We like and respect each other. We are open to the
saving grace of appellate work-those next cases that force us to
move beyond whatever unpleasantness attended the resolution
of the last case. There is no time to dwell on the past. Also, even
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with the natural affinity that some judges have for each others'
views, we understand that there are no enduring alliances in
appellate work. Every case poses the potential of an uncommon
opponent or ally. Thus we know that irreparable breaches are
unwise.
We also understand that our working life will be more
enjoyable if we get along with each other. To overcome
moments of tension, we rely on the forms of civility-the
plaudits for a circulating opinion, the deferential tone of a memo
expressing reservations about an opinion, the apologies for
continuing doubt, the invocation of "respectfully" at the
beginning of a dissent. We realize that acting nice even if we do
not feel nice at the moment is a good habit for appellate judges
seeking to preserve collegiality on their court.
Still, this happy picture of my court does not dispel my
disquiet with lobbying during the en banc process. At the
margins, in those en banc reviews achieved by lobbying, I worry
that the resulting hard feelings may impair the conditions for
principled agreement described by Judge Edwards. I believe too
that losing an open contest on the request for en banc review,
one conducted through memos shared with all of the judges
involved in the process, would not cause the dismay that a loss
preceded by lobbying engenders. Moments of disaffection
matter even if they are redeemable. We would be more at ease
with each other if there were less lobbying during the en banc
process.
This is a subject that judges should talk about. Healthy
institutions, like healthy individuals, must be self-aware and
willing to explore difficult subjects that affect their well-being.
Lobbying is such a subject. It does not lend itself to written rules
of conduct ("There shall be no lobbying") or absolute judgments
("Lobbying is never justified"). It involves prerogatives of
conduct that judges hold dear. It is, however, a source of
discontent that might be alleviated by an open discussion of the
necessity for the practice and its costs. There is nothing to lose
by such openness and perhaps much to gain. It is worth a try.

